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Just a thought experiment.
Let's say there's a perfect physical copy of you, everything from DNA to brainwaves to memories. There is no physical difference between you, except for the space that you occupy, which can easily be rearranged so that you occupy one another's space. Why are you one and not the other?
Well, let's see.
1) I am myself(a tautology)
2) This other being is another being, despite whatever similarities it has.
3) I am not beings that are other than myself. (basically another tautology)
4) Therefore, I am not this other being
The only questionable premise might be 2, and it really is not that questionable.
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Why is it today and not yesterday? Why are you the person that you are, and not William Shakespeare or Jesus of Nazareth or Hilary Clinton?
Well, if time is an ordering between temporal states, and one set of temporal states separates us between today and yesterday, then the fact that this different exists is all that is necessary.
Well, if I am myself, then I cannot be the other people. I cannot not be myself though, because I am myself is a tautology, so I don't really see a proper basis for the question.
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Still with our perfect physical copy... let's say it was possible to cut your body in half, down the center, and still keep the halves of your body alive, then do the same for your perfect copy, and swap sides with them, so your left half was attached to their right, and vica versa. Unlikely but theoretically possible. Which one is you, now? Does it matter?
It really does not matter at this point actually. I mean, identity is partially just our own little tracking device, but I doubt there is an ontological foundation for identity and at this question there is a basic breakdown in the intuition anyway.
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You have subjectivity because you are distinct, you might say a "unique one." But what is the "you" that is? Is it non-physical? If so, what does it mean to be a "non-physical" entity?
Well, in a sense I am non-physical, however, I am quite physical. The physicality emerges from the non-physicality in a way that I would also think is relatively non-ontological, as in there is no spirit or anything like that. I am a "unique one" precisely because there is no ontology above me planning me, and because in as much as I perceive the world, I will things to happen according to that will and the things I will are by nature unlike the things willed by any other being, even my clone.