Philosophy of Mind

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If brains of sufficient power display it now, then I do not see why material composition would necessary limit computers from displaying the same thing. I am not an expert on neuroscience or computer engineering though, so I will not be aware of all of the potential problems in that may pop up.

A case against absolute dualism I could think of, is that it seems more likely to me to be more like a perceived illusion from studing or analizying consciousness, giving counsciousness to be a separated entity from the body, however, that would be either an illusion or just a concept that serves to separate them into different fields or so, an abstract concept.

Nondualism seems to make more sense, after all, the mind seems to be absolutely dependent of the body, a big part of our mind is about learning through perceived experiences through the senses, all we know and learn are gained through the physical means of gaining those experiences, the vision and hearing as examples, I doubt we can succesfully separate our memories gained through those senses from the physical means of getting them. That said, it would be impossible for our mind to see without the physical eyes, our mind cannot possibly hear without the physical ears, as well as other sensations as pleasure and pain, our mind cannot possibly learn and even think without perceiving and getting information gained through the physical aspect of our bodies.

I like Thomas Metzinger's example (or at least one he refers to often).

Imagine a neuroscientist of such genius that she knows everything there is to know about the brain and it's millions of neurons.
However, she has spent her entire life in a underground lab with no yellow objects at all. She has never seen the colour yellow.

One day she walks out of the lab and sees a yellow tulip. Has she gained any new knowledge from seeing the yellow tulip?

If you think she has, you are a dualist to some extent.

I don't think that she has.

Virtually no problems with that

But that's not the same as thought

Well, thought is a different property than chemical processes. I am a property dualist, to me, a biological computer can both work by chemical processes and generate the mental process of consciousness.

Whether you like it or not, without electro-chemical action there is no thought. Thought is not a ghostly phantom floating through the brain, it is a physical action of brain components.

Or maybe thought arises from the physical action of brain components.

You are all wrong anyway.
Just read Being and Time by Heidegger, he pretty much destroyed science and this kind of thinking (cartesian dualism, which modern science is based upon).

Simply because we never asked ourselves, what is being?

What makes you think that?

For something destroyed science seems rather lively these days. I have not spent much time looking into Heidegger but the term "being" is so unexplained as to convey little if any sense.

Aradford:
Modern science has based itself on a purely Physicalist point of view.

Although I myself am a Cartessian Dualist, it is a paradigm that is not shared by many in the scientific community.

Or both.

Really, unless there's something really special going on inside our heads at the subatomic level that we haven't found out yet, nervous function is essentially similar to the functions of various kinds of artificial computers, to the point that the techniques of emulating neural activity have improved rapidly since the idea was first introduced in the late 40's, from leech-like artificial brains in the early 90's to steadily starting to encroach on our territory in the present time. Our models are still kind of simple and only use the most obvious discrete (digital) function of neurons, sending '1' (firing) when they reach a certain threshold, and sending '0' (not firing) when they don't. Regardless, it's really almost the same shit beyond that, just more elaborate and implemented a little differently ... the fact that ANNs don't use the continuous functions and other behaviors that real neurons have means diddlysquat to me about whether these additional processes leap over the infinitely wide chasm from objective electrochemical activity to subjective sensations that can't be characterized physically: they don't.

I used to be a dualist, but then I read about how people with Alzheimer's and Dementia change and saw it in a relative to a certain amount. Now I have a much more physicalist viewpoint (I am not completely denying any possibility of the non-physical, but see it very unlikely).

@Letum: Does the person have violet items (with those, no special knowledge is needed to experience yellow, iirc)?

There is nothing special about yellow in my example. Ther person could be blind to all colours, or even totally blind to all sight.

That just means one part is broken...

I'm thinking I sympathize with something like property dualism, but I haven't given it serious thought.