Atheists - prove it.

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Sure, and I think we agree that is even necessary in spite of some people feeling "left out" or just too skittish about even coming into PPR.

But then many years ago, I once invited my younger daughter to join in at WorthyBoards, a Christian forum, and I tried to make a couple of introductions I thought might help her feel comfortable there as a new member on her very first board ever.

Whew. She had only made about her third post there before some screwball punky nut tore into her, and I really felt bad about having even invited her along in the first place. So, I guess "stuff" just happens even anywhere someone might be.

The Problem of Suffering

• Most monotheistic religions postulate an all-powerful and all-knowing God who is also all-good.
• The monotheist's conception of "Good" generally entails that sadists or people who brutalize children for no apparent reason or "to build character" are evil.
• An all-knowing God by definition knows the future (perfect divine foresight) and an all-powerful God by definition has the power to create any sort of Universe they like.
• This universe has significant pain, agony, and death that results from natural disasters affects children. It brutalizes them.
• Via point 3, God knew this as he created the universe and had the power to do something differently.
• As per point 5, God brutualizes children for no apparent reason.
• All theodicies used to explain this usually rely on "free will" (which, while rather dubious, also doesn't apply to natural disasters) or "character-building" (refered to in point 2 as sadistic regardless). These theodicies can be overcome by noting that given point 3, said God could create a Univverse in which both character is developed and children are not brutualized.
• Thus, an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good God probably doesn't exist.

The Paradox of Omnipresence

• Monotheists typically define God as being "everywhere at once".
• Monotheists also define God as "transcending the Universe", meaning that he is outside the bounds of the universe.
• Via the law of non-contradiction, God cannot simultaneously be nowhere and everywhere at once.
• Thus, this Monotheistic God is a logical contradiction in terms.

Principle of Parsimony

• A God, which is defined as a divine being with the power to create and contravene physical regularities, doesn't fit into our current explanatory framework. Most things attributed to "God" tend to be explained under other theories laterwards (God of the Gaps) and no theories of divine intervention get into the mechanics of such a being, so they are useless vague.
• Given that a universe in which this vague, non-explanatory weight pulling, being being exists has more problems in explanation created than solved, it is rational to exclude such an entity due to parsimony considerations.

Trouble with a substanceless mind

• God possesses all the qualities of a human mind.
• The structure and material of God's mind is generally unspecified in most religions or stated as some sort of "pure mental stuff".
• Modern scientific understanding shows that there is no "pure mental stuff" and all mental activity depends on neural activity which depends on a physical brain.
• Thus, a substanceless superpowerful mind probably doesn't exist.

Superiority of Historical-Sociological-Anthropologically reductionist accounts of Theistic belief

• Accounts of religion with a "divine source" or "progressive direction" have been given in historical, sociological, and anthropological social sciences.
• These accounts are very reductionistic, relying solely on social sources and no "divine guiding", convergence to divine truth, or corruption from a historical point of doctrinal purity (the original point was some vague sort of animinism with omnipresent supernatural action in every microdetail of life, something that has clearly been udnercut with the development of modern science).
• This account wouldn't be so successful if there was a divine source.
• Thus, a divine source probably doesn't exist.

I think your other arguments don't really work as well.

The Paradox of Omnipresence might get into too much squishiness, as the terms you are trying to work with are within academic philosophy, that might not be necessary to the Christian faith, particularly in the definitions and framings you use. It's not terrible, but I don't like it.

Trouble with a substanceless mind seems to beg the question on materialism. You seem to basically say "human minds are materialist therefore God's mind has to be". It doesn't seem plausible though, as a "metaphysical mind" seems logically possible. If you could make your criticism based upon cognitive science, which does focus on the logical requirements of minds, this might seem better. However, otherwise, this really is not much of an argument, and most of the benefits seem gained from the argument from parsimony.

Does that make sense. I really like the latter presented argument, even though it can be lumped in with the principle of parsimony. (Unless understood as a (p)rebuttal to certain theistic arguments)

Right. Any discussion about things of this nature is purely speculative. It comes down to what makes sense to you, and what you feel comfortable with.

There might be some problems that the Paradox of Omnipresence gets into in terms of spatial-temporal intuitions, but the substanceless mind is a very strong inductive/abductive argument.

@MP

The Problem of Suffering

Requires there to be a best of all possible worlds... it is not possible... it is like asking what is the greatest natural number.

The Paradox of Omnipresence
Trouble with a substanceless mind

Begs the question of materialism

Principle of Parsimony

Begs the question of naturalism.

Superiority of Historical-Sociological-Anthropologically reductionist accounts of Theistic belief

Genetic Fallacy

Trying to make sense of that ...


I have no way to know whether that statement is accurate in relation to the there-categorized or -stereotyped "monotheist" or is possibly just rhetorical spin, but I do know it is certainly not in tune with Scripture.

But then if we consider ol' Noah's definition of "entail" ...



... I think it becomes very easy to see who had been doing the entailing -- unalienable fixing -- there ...

So then, the above statement is nothing more than rhetorical spin!

No, it really doesn't. M_P's only relying on certain acts being indefensible, not on a best of all possible worlds existing.

Even further, one could still make an argument against a perfectly good God even if a best of all possible worlds didn't exist. The argument is that moral perfection of a creator being would be impossible, because such a being would be doomed to making a moral choice x1 which < x2. Well, a hypothetical nearly identical being that picks x2 over x1 would be morally better, as such a being has one morally better choice than the other. This means that moral imperfection is arguably impossible, because this goes on ad infinitum.


Not really... the argument is actually an argument for naturalism. The only criticism is that he's not engaging questions of viability, but.... he's not obligated to do so when presenting the argument(in fact, that'd be rather absurd). He's only obligated to defend the argument against those who think naturalism is not viable or has some problem.


Disagree. The argument appears to be something like this:

1) We have materialist accounts of religion that are very successful
2) The success of these accounts is highly improbable given theism.
3) Therefore, theism is probably false

This is kind of similar to the principle of parsimony argument... now that I think about it, it is different, but now that I think about it, M_P could have made this into a broader argument of explanatory success of naturalism against theism.

1) We have materialist accounts of reality that are very successful
2) The success of these accounts is highly improbable given theism.
3) Therefore, theism is probably false

Note: The term "success" isn't something to look too closely into, as it's merely a quick and dirty paraphrase of the kinds of things one could say that have epistemic validity.

How the 'ell does it assume that? All it assumes is that God could conceivable make a world without natural disasters and that's what he can do by definition under the mantle of being "all-powerful"



I don't have the time to list several hundreds of a words detailing the strength of physicalism in neuroscience, especially given that the OP is a novice asking for pretty basic reasons.



Okay, show where supernatural hypothesis lead to specific advances or are helpful explanations rather than vague arese placeholders.



Uh, no, it was stated that purely historical-sociological-anthropologically reductionist accounts wouldn't be as accurate if there was some substance to said beliefs.

I actually agree with 91 on this case. I mean, whether or not human minds are physical, doesn't mean that divine minds have to be. I mean, that's just that. I don't think you meant to structure what you provided as a logical argument, but... from what I see, I know that there is a begged question. Because, it doesn't *matter* whether "mental stuff" exists in the human mind, we can still build an immaterial mind out of immaterial components. Saying that we can't build that formal structure out of non-material components would have to beg the question.

Oh, I also don't think the omnipresence issue is begging the question of materialism. The problem is that a definition of transcendence is incompatible with a definition of omnipresent. I just... don't think it's the most powerful place to put our intuitions.

AG

So your side stepping the issue and using the same logic...

If there is no best possible world, all a perfect being needs to do is create a good one (there could always be one more angel singing praise or one more happy person). In the case of moral choice the same is true.... you completely missed the point and committed exactly the same mistake as MP.



Lol... so your sayings its ok to beg the question.... more fail. You cannot make an argument for naturalism from naturalism. I cant believe that you are actually saying this stuff.



You just constructed an argument that incorporates the genetic fallacy... Your second premise is unjustifiable and depends on the genetic fallacy to work. The origin of a belief has NO bearing on its truth value.

'Genetic accounts of an issue may be true, and they may help illuminate the reasons why the issue has assumed its present form, but they are irrelevant to its merits.'
With Good Reason: An Introduction to Informal Fallacies (Fifth Edition) by S. Morris Engel, chapter V, subsection 1 (pg. 198)

MASTER_PENANT



You missed the point... totally. There is always a better world... there can always be one less earthquake or one more happy person.



So your citing materialism to prove materialism... hence begging the question.



Still begging the question.



Still committing a genetic fallacy. What a total fail... an utter complete fail.

No.... you just *STILL* lack the ability to evaluate arguments.


No, I presented an argument. You ignored it. My argument is that a being who creates world x1 is less moral than a being who creates x2, and if the scale goes on infinitely, then a morally perfect being couldn't exist. This is based upon the definition of a morally perfect being as one where there is no possible being that is more praiseworthy, or morally commendable, or anything else. This is not a failed argument.

Secondly, your argument has NOTHING to do with M_P's argument. M_P argued that certain things are morally incompatible with a perfect God, not that a perfect God has to create a perfect world. Failing to read is still a failing.

I committed no error. You've made no improvements since you left.


No, I am not. If you have problems reading, PLEASE go talk to someone about it.

The argument is this:
1) Naturalism is viable.(this means it is possible for all of the facts of this world to be compatible with naturalism)
2) Naturalism is the most parsimonious view.
3) We should accept the most parsimonious view if it is viable
4) We should accept naturalism if it is viable (2 and 3)
5) We should accept naturalism (1 and 4)\

1) is not equivalent to 5) . Thus, no begging of the question has occurred. If you can't interpret this from the statements you had seen, then you might need some work, BUT... I made no error in this.


Ok, but it's a premise and a deductive argument. In any case, really, the big issue is that you want all of the interpretations guiding premise 2 to be unpacked.

In any case, you mean "logically it is possible that a belief is true regardless of origins", this is true. However, this does not mean that origins don't matter when evaluating a belief's probability of being correct. After all, truth-tracking is one of our epistemic guidelines, and if major intuitive supports for theism are shown to be questionable, then it may be that theism ought to be considered highly improbable given this, or at least that theism is less likely.

That being said, I know I didn't originally like this argument, and I still don't like the form it is in, I just don't think it commits any logical fallacy. Even the genetic fallacy of relevance won't really work if the case is inductive, which it was.


Irrelevant to everybody.


Except....... you aren't engaging his argument AT ALL. First of all, there can't always be one less earthquake, as 0 earthquakes is logically possible. Secondly, he didn't make an argument from better worlds, he made an argument from certain sufferings being unjustifiable. This is explicit. This means you are persisting in error.


Actually, he wasn't there. Y'see, the parsimony claim is that no other explanation is simpler. He asked you whether another, better explanation(simpler and all of that) existed. You are not answering that. However, so long as none are known, the argument from parsimony works.


This is what I think every time you write on this forum, and it is correct every time you write on this forum.

The only reason AG is beating me to responding to 91 is because I'm tired and it's 2:00 AM where I live. If these factors weren't in place, I too would be running circles around 91.

By the way, how can you make such poor arguments and yet still have gotten tenure or, for that matter, succeded in a doctoral cross-examination?

You just made the same mistake... again. God being the perfect moral good and God not being able to do the logically impossible does not disprove God. There is ALWAYS a better world... so it cannot be incumbent on a perfect being to create the perfect world... since such a world is a logical impossibility.



Actually it contains both... since he did not use numbers on his 'fantastic' argument. I was disputing his 'third' dot point. Best possible worlds certainly does exist in this premise. Failing to read is still a failing. I did not engage with the idea of unjustified suffering (which btw begs the question of objective morality)... It certainly does exist within the argument. I only need to disprove the argument once though.



This is such a bad argument... for starters the second and third premises are arguments in support of the first. You can leave those out. The reason it begs the question is that naturalism is not supportable without naturalism. Your first premise begs the question; it assumes that all of the words facts are compatible with naturalism. This simply cannot be proven without reference to those things within naturalism.




You are still justifying a genetic fallacy. Saying how a belief originates has no bearing on its truth. A child might think that racism is wrong simply because their parents tell them so. This has no bearing on the truth of the statement 'racism is wrong'. The origin of a religious idea has no value on its truth.

Last edited by 91 on 13 May 2011, 7:01 am, edited 2 times in total.

Hope you don't mind me bumping in here.. Just want to make a brief comment..

God's apparent contradictions make it easy to question (maybe not disprove) your interpretation of God, in the very least. Based on the Christian scriptures, a perfect world is not an impossibility because it reportedly was once so. Through the excuse of "freewill", God set his own limitations and apparently had to let the world go to s**t. He can't "fix" it because that would contradict his choice of giving this freewill and would prove God to be fallible. By this reasoning, God shot himself in the foot and has too much pride to admit it.

^^^^

Eden is not described as a perfect world.