Solipsism?

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To clarify the terminology, I should have used the word "belief" in place of "faith" in my previous post. Religious faith and scientific knowledge both require belief, as there is no certainty beyond our immediate sensations (qualia). So I would say that faith is a subset of belief, i.e a type of belief, but the terms shouldn't be confused.

I would define faith as a belief that is formed based on some emotional desire for the belief to be true. I have a major problem with this. There is no way I can make something true by willing it to be true. There is also the problem that having an emotional connection to a belief makes doubt something unpleasant.

Science, on the other hand, is based on evidence. Evidence is just another word for the recognition of consistent patterns and relationships. I would say there is a small amount of faith required even in science. The belief that the universe is consistent may be partially due to an emotional desire, as the belief in an inconsistent universe would lead to paranoia. However, I don't think this type of faith is the quite the same as a religious faith. It seems to me that religious faith is almost completely based on emotional need while other forms of belief are formed through a combination of evidence and emotional need.

I know some people will claim that religion is in fact based on evidence as well as faith. I just personally have trouble seeing this as there have been literally thousands of religious beliefs throughout human history. Choosing one religion over another through an emotional whim is completely absurd in my mind. This goes back to the problem of trying to believe something because I want it to be true. To me, beliefs are a reflection of how I interpret reality. How can I expect to change reality by changing my beliefs? My beliefs can only be changed if evidence leads me to reform my views of reality.

I also find it strange to claim that something (e.g. God) is unknowable, yet this unknowable being is requiring us to have faith.

miku, either all are wriong or there is only one solipsist who is right.
if you dont read solipsism that stringent, i.e. as a metaphysical/ontological statement that there really doesnt exist anything except yourself, but rather like "i am the only thing that is given to me as being and act according to it", you just have a kind of honesty bonus.

That is too egocentric, my opinion is that all is imagined, besides the tangible.

I don´t quite understand how you can claim that numbers exist without being dependent on real-world objects or existence. Every example in your statement referred to a real-world object, or something that exists. If nothing exists, nothing can be identified. Higher mathematics explain space and time, but they only exist because of lower mathematics. Calculus wouldn´t exist without addition.

No, three doesn´t exist because there are apples, but it is impossible for it to exist if there were no apples at all, as explained in my previous post.



No, mathematics is not based on causality, but it is not based solely on "content" either, nor are they "ideal entities" that are true outside of human convention. They are based on agreement. Agreement on the emprical observations of real world objects or things that exist. And, If there were no real world objects to agree upon, there would be no mathematics. They are not determined by their content alone, because the content must be agreed upon. Content without agreement makes something meaningless. Why does 2+2 = 4? Because we all agree that it does. In a land where everyone agrees that 2+2=5 (one is tempted to say here that this is not possible, but the only reason you can say that is because of our mathematical system, their system may be perfectly coherent also), your assertion that 2+2=4 is meaningless. All you can do is say that, "well, where I come from, its 4", and to them, this would be no argument at all. Content is meaningless without agreement. The structure of mathematics is not determined solely by their "content", because then you must answer the question of where this content came from.

Your explanation for mathematics is like saying this: "it is the very nature of a touchdown that touchdowns are six points because of the "content" of the game of football". This has explained nothing about why touchdowns are six points. Touchdowns are six points because we all agree that they are, not because of the "content" of the football game.

Sheer succession is based on the application of mathematics to the real world. How can you prove succession without a backdrop? That would be like proving you have three apples to a blind man without letting him touch them. Whether something progresses in succession or not cannot be judged by its self. There must be a yardstick which confirms the measurement.

Yes, you are right about the shape of the grid not mattering (as said in my previous post), but you have said nothing about the box that it covers. And that was what the discussion was about. Whether the grid could exist without the box.

jonathan:

no, actually, i didnt refer to numbers being founded in real world objects.
i said that algebra is based on the form of time - not time. the form of time is a category within ourselves, therefore we can experience the world in actual time. the form, an empty template, so to say, (the yardstick you speak of - its devoid of any actual scale relevant to reality when not applied to it) is within us, and what this form is all about is the idea of succession. still, no real world thing involved. just succession itself, not things in succession.
same with geometry, just that its about the epistemological category of space, which is responsible that we can experience the world in space.

as for three and apples: if there werent three of any kind of things (ill add something to that point later), we may not learn of three by experience. if there werent any things at all, we may not learn about any numbers by experience. but the way you learn something is not to be confused with what this something is by its nature.
numbers dont occur in reality (ever seen a two in its natural habitat? its lovely when its chirping around, happily adding itself to its mate to produce the most cute fours) and they dont conform to any rules and workings of the real world. the way mathematics (and any a priori synthetic judgements) work is devoid of anything we see in the world - mathematics itself is devoid of anything empirical (although we learn of it through experience... it itself is not)

[aforementioned side note: the notion of seeing three apples and deriving three - "three apples" dont have anything to do with the concept of three. in the real world, any concept of identity forbids having a grasp of three times the same thing - the three apples are sufficiently similar in some random terms of our perception to see them as a group of three rather than the three completely unrelated individual entities they are. the fact that we still tend to see groups instead of single things is discussed in gestalt theory. reality by its nature can not reproduce some true representation of the idea of three - either there are three unrelated objects which we impose the three onto -a priori again- or there just arent three things if we are dealing with one identity]

as for our mathematical system and conventions: we are talking the very concept of a given number, not its accepted bundle of name, value, symbol... and therefore, its unimportant how you write them, how you call them, and in which system you order them. its about succession - the sheer fact where some entities are located forces the conclusions of mathematics. in a carthesian way: you can say that 2+2=5, but then, these are just empty words. you can not mean it. (and im not referring to the names/symbols/other cultural appendages of the numbers but the numbers themselves - their content)
your metaphor lacks in so far (for you), as you mix up two different levels. the rules of american football are agreed on, of course... but american football is a very real thing. the very basic algebraic dictum of 1+1=2 (an axiom for the science of mathematics, but for itself, a perfect example of an a priori apodictic sentence) however does not work by agreement.
if all thoughts (and memories and books and websites...) of the rules of american football somehow vanished, indeed, no one would even know about touchdowns, let alone that they are six points.
if all thoughts (...) of mathematical laws, axioms and whatever vanished this instant, we still would agree that going one step (no matter even what kind of a step, and where) further brought us to a point that is one step further.

ugh... such a lot to type, and its not one significant bit beyond kants epistemology (okay, spiced with one or two tiny bits of husserls logical investigations). :/

gekitsu:

You say that logic and mathematical entities are ideal objects that exist independent of real objects. In logic and pure mathematics we try and use as little reference to real objects as possible. All of mathematics can be based upon a set of axioms along with the rules of logical deduction. I guess my opinion is that the basic sets of axioms and the rules of logical deduction would be meaningless without real objects.

You argue that the most basic mathematical objects (i.e. sets) are not based on any real world objects. Looking at the apple example, it's true that no two apples will be identical. The idea of there being three apples requires some framework to define exactly what is meant by "apple". However, well defined real world objects that mimic "ideal" mathematical objects do exist. You just have to look at the quantum level rather than the macroscopic level. There you can find discreet objects.

I believe there may be a connection between the axioms of set theory and quantum mechanical objects.

marshall: you are right - all mathematics and logics are indeed without a directly related meaning. how could one perceive differently, i wonder? when doing logics tables or working out an equiation - tell me were you have to try not to have relations to real-world objects. i think youd have to try getting such a connection there first place.

as for axioms: that was a touchy subject in quite a few seminars on kant - but basically its easily resolved.
of course, when forming a science called mathematics, it has to conform to scientific rules - not having cornerstones to logically build upon would end you with a circular reasoning throughout the whole thing. therefore, fot the sake of scientific tactfullness and correctness, 1+1=2 and those basicsd need to be axioms.

however, what is meant here, when talking about a priori and a posteriori and all that, is not the science but the actual doing. the mind acts of doing maths. what kant calls judgements. and in these mind acts, you can not deviate from the conclusion of those axioms in earnest. there are no "external reasons" to them, and nothing you have to add to it (like you have to add causality by yourself to judge that the white ball rolled into the red balls because ronnie o'sullivan hit it with the queue - this is an a posteriori jugement), they just form themselves by their very meaning.
as said before: just because we learn of concepts via experience (of the real world necessarily) doesnt conclude that these concepts are based on real world entities. just because we use cogwheels in an old calculator to execute mathematical tasks doesnt conclude that the mathematical rules are based on physical cogwheels turning.

but still, these are quite basics we are discussing about, nothing special. quite some semesters ago i studied these
but at last, i seem to get a bit of insight where anglo-saxon influenced thinkers have their problems with continental philosophy.

Gekitsu:

You keep citing Kant, but I am speaking about Wittgensteins answer to Kants philosophy. Yes, the form of time is a category within ourselves, but this perception is a perception about something. Another being would have a different perception of time, but again, this would only be possible to know if something exists. Without existence, there would be no way to measure the differences of perception, but, more importantly, there would be no way to apply our perceptions. If we cannot apply our perceptions, then they cannot exist. This is the point that I keep trying to make, but you keep arguing that because three is not in nature, then it doesn´t need nature to come about.

You cannot compare somethings "nature" and forget about how that "nature" came about. Three would never come about if nothing existed. You keep saying that two is not in nature, and I keep agreeing with you. But, where we differ is that I am saying that two cannot come about if nature didn´t exist, and you are saying that it exists. It exists "out there" somewhere, even if nature doesn´t.

In reply to your statement, "I cannot mean 2 + 2 =5, you are right, but I have already stated this. I said specifically to answer this foreseen rebuttal that, "one is tempted to say here that this is not possible, but the only reason you can say that is because of our mathematical system, their system may be perfectly coherent also"

You keep referring to their "content", but you have not explained where this "content" came from. It comes from agreement. Agreement between human beings on the empirical observations of reality. You state that," we still would agree that going one step (no matter even what kind of a step, and where) further brought us to a point that is one step further." The key word here is agree. An animal cannot agree to this, nor can a rock, nor a tree. This can only come about through the cognitive processes in the human mind, which shows that mathematics and logic are products of the human mind based on emprical agreements over existing objects. They do not exist "out there", but in our minds.

You state: "of course, when forming a science called mathematics, it has to conform to scientific rules - not having cornerstones to logically build upon would end you with a circular reasoning throughout the whole thing. therefore, fot the sake of scientific tactfullness and correctness, 1+1=2 and those basicsd need to be axioms." Which is basically saying that we need to agree on such axioms to be logically coherent. But, why do things need to be logically coherent?!? Why must they conform to scientific rules?!? This now implies that logical coherence is something "out there", that exists seperate from human convention. You keep adding things that need to be "out there" for your theory to be coherent.

My replies have gone much further than the Kantian analysis of synthetic a priori propositions. You just have not seen it yet. I now see the problem of stopping ones studies at Kant, and not moving on to Wittgenstein.

Gekitsu:

Let me know if this is correct. What you are saying is that there are two separate aspects of reality (or perhaps of our experience of reality to be more precise). One is our direct experience of the world through our senses, while the other consists of abstract "ideal" entities (i.e. concepts, logic, etc.) which our brain must use to interpret that experience. Kant seems to say that these are entirely independent things if I understand correctly. That we can't interpret our experience without first accepting the truth of these "ideal" entities.

My opinion is that these "ideal" things are not at all separate from the natural world and our perceptual experience. I think they may be shown one in the same if we look deep enough. We just don't have a sufficient understanding of the natural world to see the connection. The number "three" does in fact exist in nature if we look at quantum states of matter/energy. This is just somewhat hidden from our everyday experience.

Please forgive me for not using the proper terminology. I don't have a formal education in philosophy beyond a 101 class. I enjoy thinking about these matters, but reading philosophy without any help in interpreting the formal language can be frustrating.

marshall: basically, the difference is like this: you have empirical experience from the world, which you gather through your senses and which are ordered by categories within you (some sort of templates): much as the whole world comes in shades of pink when you look at it through pink sunglasses, you have space sunglasses and time sunglasses within you, as well as for example causality sunglasses.
now, there is a state of a posteriori (latin for something like "afterwards"), referring to mental things that happen after you have experience. not specifically temporal, but more systematically - experience first, then a posteriori judgements. like you see rain and a wet street, seen through causality sunglasses, you link them up to form a causal chain. you do that, its not there in your impressions of the world.
but there also are judgements that happen a priori (latin for sth. like "before" - again, systematically). kant cites as examples mathematic calculation, whose elements are not something you can experience in the world (maybe, you got the mental grasp of those elements via an image that comes from the world, however), but they are based on the kind of sunglasses within you - without specific content from the world. the judgements arent done by applying causality to experience, but since you are handling completely abstract things, its what these things are that makes the judgement.
i said that this kind of being is not dependent of the real world, because the way we handle them indicate that these have completely different origins - and therefore, have different workings. i think that abstract is the less confusing term than ideal (ideal has a lot of connotations that can mislead) - pure mind-things, so to say.

jonathan79: sorry, i think i completely didnt get you - referring to wittgenstein, you and i mean different things with the term "being". i am not a big fan of the linguistic turn, though, and absolutely dont agree that reality is something that exists through word, by which agreement takes the strong rule you vouch for. no wonder we kept disagreeing - to me, the number isnt the agreement, its the sheer idea, the sheer pre-language concept of a certain point on a scale everybody has within him/herself. of course, when we want to talk these things, we have to agree to a minimum degree, but my point is that before agreeing, we may have different words or in case of synaesthetics, different impressions bundled with it that dont need to agree, but draw the same conclusions, as long as we are thinking about the same points on our innate scales - systematically way before any kind of language and agreement comes into play.

i hold the opinion that the only real systematic starting point can be the isolated subject, the individuum. having reality, for me, comes way before any kind of language enters the stage. therefore, i keep with descartes, kant and husserl, even schopenhauer - basing meaning, content and other basic things in language absolutely doesnt float my boat (in lack of a better term - meaning: i can not get myself to think that way because it runs contrary to how world is given to me).

sorry, though - i didnt mean to come off derogatory. english isnt my native tongue, and therefore, i just didnt get your point right (i dont disagree with that point of analysis of language, obviously, but i doubt languages role in epistemological processes). i just thought you and i didnt click at a different point of incompatibility between anglosaxon and continental schools of thought (not that there were so few of them).

Yes, perhaps we are disagreeing at the foundation. For me, to deny language and try to explain things from the individual is impossible. With the individual, everything is out of focus. Like a man who needs glasses to see staring out into a field. He cannot tell what anything is, everything is a blur. Then, he puts on a pair of glasses and everything comes into focus. There is a tree there, a bird there, two rocks over there, etc., etc. Then, he takes off his glasses and explains these things too you, but denies that he knows these things because he put on a pair of glasses.

Wittgenstein does not deny these things exist in the field without glasses, he just denies that you can put glasses on, see everything, then try to deny that you have ever put these glasses on while explaining only what you have seen with your glasses. To explain epistemology by denying language is to put on a pair of glasses, then explain only what you have seen with your glasses, but deny that you have ever worn them. This makes no sense to me.

Kants description of mathematics also does not make sense to me. He says that they exist because of their "content", and that this content is so because of the very "nature" of mathematics. This runs in a circle for me. It´s like asking, "why does opium put people to sleep?". Then one answers, "because of its contents". And, these contents are there because it is in the "nature" of opium to contain these contents. It really doesn´t tell me anything.

Also, when he speaks about the origins of things, he really hasn´t explained anything either. All he has done is move epistomology to a different "faculty", one that exists "somewhere", but this still doesn´t explain anything. This is akin to me to saying that God created the universe in an attempt to answer where the universe came from. All we have done is moved the location of the answer, we have not explained anything.

My apologies too for being a little irratated. The past two weeks haven´t been very good to me, and I tend to get bristled easy when that happens.

no offense taken. lets just forget it...

as for thinking/world-forming on a language-base: id be interested, how do picture-thinkers fit into that? or how do several observations of gestalt theorists fit, when perception and processing instantly notices patterns, even when you didnt have a "language term" or a pure-abstract concept of it before? (hardcore kantians have something to explain here, too - thats why i tend to phenomenology, if in doubt.)
of course, perception in a pre-language manner, without a potential social quality (thinking in language must be something circularly social, pretending to explaining to oneself as one would to another person - side note: this model clearly fails for me... to explain something to myself, i must have gotten it already. and indeed, insight comes with a click, WHAM and there it is - and i might have quite the trouble putting it in words) lacks reassurance, naturally. yet, i regard that as a social afterword - something that belongs more to social sciences than to philosophy. to me, this is more about group behaviour and rites.

language is important, though, and i tend to agree with the role you sketched in your metaphor of needing glasses - just that i wouldnt put it to use for forming ones world at such a basic level. id rather say that language mimics a lot of functions we have on a pre-language level (such as perceiving patterns across different single entities etcetera).
but language sure has this function that "orders" by assigning one term to several individual things. its so much more helpful to call upon a static category of "horseness", although every baby horse is a tiny step derived from the horse parents, eventually forming something new (non-horsish). i still think we do these labelling things before assigning names for social purposes.

as for kants explanation of mathematics: if it was about the science of mathematics, youd be absolutely right. thats why those basics carry the roles of axioms. some semesters ago, there was one physics professor in a seminar on kants who kept pointing out the circularity of using the content of an axiom (that the straight line is the shortest distance between two points) to prove what the axiom says.
its not about the science, though, but about "mathematic thoughts", so to say. kant is focussed on the mental processes at all times. it is in the very nature of what points and straight lines are (i.e.: what they are in our mental process - not what the science of mathematics defines them to be) that makes you unable to think any different from a straight line being the shortest distance between two points.
of course, when forming a science upon these kind of thoughts, you wont be able to prove the "think-necessities" you base everything on from within the system, cause that, indeed, would be circular reasoning. thats for the sake of the science, though, and doesnt affect the mental processes which were there in the beginning.
in the end, its the question what was there in the beginning: an abstract idea of two derived from the categories that underlie our every perception (a purely subjective mental labelling, so to say), or the lingual agreement what constitutes two (an intersubjective, social labelling).

as for the origin of things: you have a point there. kant basically stopped ontology in its tracks to shift focus to epistemology. by that, the center of research shifted from the world and the things to the subject.
that the abstract thing-in-itself isnt a satisfying solution was schopenhauers main point of critique on kants epistemology. for him, this was just an empty term like hegels world spirit. a logical necessity rather than a clear observation (by the way, is there an english term for describing somehow a kind of experiencability, but not in an empirical manner? roughly something like: "i cant prove it to you, but just look at yourself what you are doing and youll see").

hmmm...interesting questions here. As far as pre-language abilities in noticing patterns and such, Wittgenstein says a couple of interesting aphorisms about the law of induction and recognition without though, which I assume he is linking to such pre-language abilities. One goes something like: "The squirrel does not use induction to gather his stores for the winter, but rather this is simply the natural law as to which he operates". And also, "the dog is afraid that his master will beat him today, but not that his master will beat him tomorrow".

I´m not sure if Wittgenstein was thinking about the particular organizational abilities that you have mentioned, but such "thinking" or "recognition" by animals is not akin to what humans do. The dog also learns not to crawl off the table, but he doesn´t know about gravity. The bear prepares to hibernate by eating enormous amounts of food, but I don´t think that they "understand" any of it. It is simply a natural law that they follow. Now, we would describe these actions as "induction", "afraid of falling", "knowing that you need food to sleep for months", but we have already infected the thought processes by our language concepts because in order to describe them, or even make sense of them, we need langauge.

This is the problem that Wittgenstein had. Once you learn language, you are already "infected" so to speak. There is no going back. This of course makes it impossible to compare things from a standpoint of pre-language and after-language. For W, there was only after-language, and there was no point in trying to describe pre-language abilities using language because you have already become infected with langauge descriptions and the concepts of grammer. You can´t take the glasses off once you put them on.

I wouldn´t even know how to go about teasing these pre-language processes apart from already learned concepts. Perhaps baby´s are able to recognize certain patterns, and this of course makes them pre-language abilities, but what exactly is the limit of these abilities? And, how exactly would we test this? At a certain point, it would be impossible to know what a baby can recognize and what it cannot because the tasks would be too complex for a baby without langauge to explain what they are doing. It would be hard to say for adults how much of these pre-conceived patterns are actually pre-language, and how much are due to the fact that we have learned language all of our life, thus our concepts are forced in a certain direction because of the way our brain has learned to process the world.

About the straight line being the shortest distance from two points: In order to recognize this at all, you need the language concepts of "straight", "line", "between" and '"shortest". Without these concepts of langauge, how can the statement, "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points" even make any sense? How can anyone recognize or have this "pre-language" "understanding" of such a statement? Thus, I would say that nothing was there in the beginning, because a dog looking at a straight line doesn´t recognize any of this. Neither would a baby. Neither would a child who had the concepts "straight" and "line", but had not yet learned the concepts of "shortest" and "between".

This can only come about after the grammatical agreement that makes the concepts "straight", "line", "between" and "shortest" intelligible. Therefore, it cannot be a pre-exiting thought process. This thought cannot be coherent without language, and, language cannot exist without agreement. So, the very "nature" of "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points" is found only in our language concepts, not our pre-language abilities.

There was an interesting show I saw on t.v a while ago about a tribe who had no language for number concepts. Here is a link about them: http://www.jcrows.com/withoutnumbers.html

If mathematics and mathematical concepts were something "pre-language", then the adults should be able to learn mathematics, but they cannot. This is probably perhaps due to the fact that the language of mathematics involves more than just numbers, they involve language concepts themselves. Such as "less", "more", "area",etc. Check it out. I wonder if we took a child from the tribe and raised them with a normal language such as English, would they be able to learn mathematics? An interesting case study indeed. But, it seems that their adults have acquired a whole way of thinking and percieving the world has been shaped already, and their brains are forced in a direction which runs contrary to certain modes of thought. Whether there language deficiencies are a genetic shortcoming could only be figured out if we raised a child with our language concepts. Either way, this shows that without such concepts mathematics is impossible, whether or not this is a genetic deficiency is irrelevant.

Thus, perhaps we are the same. Because of the language we have learned, our brains are forced in a certain direction when recognizing patterns, and there is no way for us to know. This amazonian tribe certainly would not have known about their deficiencies had the outside world not descended upon them. Nor would they have known something called "mathematics" ever existed. Perhaps we will never know what might have been possible until an alien race shows us the shortcomings of our language and thought system.

I´m not sure about an english term for what you describe, I´ll have to think about it. We are certainly having an interesting discussion here though. I have never before considered the questions you are asking.

the discussion for sure is very interesting. im having a blast. i have to scrutinize a lot of what i took as a given due to its insightfulness (to me)

as it is quite late (and i am in need of finishing my stretching exercises and getting a shave) here, ill only post a few short fragments that came to mind:

language as infection: yeah, language sure does influence thinking - but not all thinking is language. i have just seen a robot nod in tv - i didnt think that he nods, as in that i recalled the language element of nodding, i just got it by loking at it. being in a mood to think about language, i drew the mental connection to language and became aware that what the robot did is called nodding in english.
language certainly is a well-working GUI for our mind.

and sure, prevalence of a concept in language ensures that we cope with them on a daily basis, thereby making the use of them become second nature.

as for the points and line thing: if someone was to tell me that a straight line blah blah blah..., id sure need language to understand what he was talking about, to decode the information on my side and think about it. what i was referring to was only the mental act. imagining nobody told us that there were the words "curved" and "straight" - wed still see different lines. maybe not linking them to terms, but able to tell them apart by what we see. (their gestalt, if you want)
or, imagine a symbol you dont know the name of, the meaning of and that you have never seen before. you still will see something and recognize it again.
its kinda hard imagining good examples... ill try to think of some.

the tribe without numbers sure is interesting. id still believe that they see the difference between one apple and two apples (like: they most likely notice the difference in their perceptions), although unable to name them (and they seem to be very untrained to think these ways. similar to how we may fail to think "in terms" of a different culture - i mean, it took the western world a few thousand years to come up with a thinker who came close to taoist thought).

Yes, definitely one of the more insightful discussions I´ve participated in since college.

Yes, I totally agree that there are things that operate on a level more fundamental than language. It seems that all cultures, and creatures in fact, have a way of greeting each other. Something beyond grammatical concepts. Wild animals are also able to pick up on friendly or threatening behavior, even through they do not know what "behavior" is.

But, the interesting question, is where is the line drawn? Each culture has insulting gestures, but they differ. Showing the sole of your shoes is an insult in some places in the middle east, but it means nothing in other places. What is extremely offensive in one culture means absolutely nothing in another. So, in some way, our fundamental "understandings" are linked, but are shaped through society and agreement.

So, surely even if you had never acquired langauge (I am thinking of cases of feral children here), you would have "recognized" in some fashion that a nod was a "friendly" gesture. But, just because we have these fundamental instincts in communication, does that mean that we have them in mathematics, and other areas?

Back to the straight line. I was thinking about this, and it seems like this is absolutely a statement that is trapped by grammer. By the very definition of the words "straight", "line", "shortest", and "between", it is impossible for any other conclusion to be reached other than "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points". Our grammer demands it.

What about the statement: "the two birds by the pond are black". Now, the very definition of the words "birds", "by", "pond", and "black" make it impossible for anything other than the two black birds by the pond to be the item in question. Yet, this does not make it something true due to its "content", does it? That probably was not the greatest example, but I think that you will get what I am trying to say.

Yes, we will still recognize a symbol if we see it again, but we do not recognize it like another person may. I can see the same chinese symbol twice and recognize it, but it means something totally different to me than to the chinese person. Just as a language that I am not familiar with will not force me a certain direction. I am sure that when a Japanese person is reading a Japanese book, they are compelled to read from back to front. Yet, should I have that same book in my hands, I will be compelled to read it from front to back. My experiences force me to have a certain impulse. Our familiarity and experiences force us in certain directions. And, it seems like a difficult (if not impossible) job to seperate where we operate on a pre-experience level, and where we operate due to experience.

I´m interested in your examples to better understand your point of view on this, so please post them later.

i think the chinese writing wasnt as bad an example as i thought: as you stated, someone fluent in chinese will associate a meaning with the perception, the "having the thing in my consciousness", whereas you just have it that way, without the meaning. you can assign a name to it, but that would be somehow unlikely, right? (i certainyl know i dont do this - i just reference the impression, the actual "having" of it in mind right now, not a given name or even a meaning.
with pre-language, i dont necessarily mean those very basic things our great^100-grandfathers in caves already had (probably) - i mean the impression, the actual having-in-the-head, way (relatively, were not talking a huge step, but a step nevertheless) before language kicks in. like: seeing, ordering, recognizing, putting name to it. you have to grasp the gestalt of a human before being able to recall that this impression is linked with the word "human" - and when he comes closer, you will need to grasp the impression of his face before you recall that this face is linked to the name "uncle joseph".

i am a bit unsure about the cultural gestures like showing soles of feet, extending middle finger and the like... they are symbols like language in a way too, arent they?

but i just got another idea: imagine you are struggling with words - you have the meaning of what you want to convey in your head but you have to search for the right grammatical figures and words to get it "translated" to language.

hehe... you know, this whole thing made me realize something i didnt understand until now: husserls (the founder of phenomenology, which is concerned almost exclusively with just perceptions and likewise "experiencing" moments) battklecry was "to the things themselves!" - and i never got whats so special about it. now i think i know: there seem to be a lot of people (not meant in an insulting manner) who seem to think about the words and names of things, rather than the things. thining about things directly seems to come naturally to me, so i never figured out what was the big deal about that famous sentence.

maths example: no, dont think about the grammatical structure of "a straight line is the closest distance between two points" - try to think about actual lines and points. if it helps, picture them in your mind... try to see the content of the sentence, not its actual "acting out", its concrete happening in the world (in the categories of vocabulary and grammar).
i realize this is a bit wonky, as we need language to transmit the information - but its about the mind judging the facts of points and lines, regardless what names. i mean, a point is still a point in my head, even if i dont know other people call it a point, right? (autodidactics would be really hard to achieve, if all learning worked only with the simultaneous acquisition of mental impression and its name)