Odin wrote:
We seem to be using different definitions of Essentialism and Nominalism. I am both a Realist and a Nominalist and I think Essentialism is a crutch that promotes bad, tautological "something acts the way it does because it is it's nature to do so" thinking that gets in the way of good explainations.
I am using these terms as they were classically used in the Middle Ages. Realism and nominalism reflect different views of universals. A middle position was conceptualism, but I do not find it to be tenable.
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I am a Realist in that I think there is a reality outside our minds that our phenomenalogical world is an approximation of
The philosophy of nominalism, as generally defined, would be inconsistent with the idea of "a reality outside of our minds" if, by reality, you mean a
single reality. If you are referring to particular realities (separate realities), such as you and I are separate realities (aka particularism), then your view would be in line with nominalism.
Nominalists generally reject the legitimacy of ontology and metaphysics, not epistemology. In other words, while nominalism is anti-realist (in the medieval sense of the word), it is not necessarily an idealist position. Most nominalists are not idealists, but some, like George Berkeley, were idealists.
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I am a Nominalist in that I think the only things that can be said to exist are the fundamental physical objects described by physics and processes made up of interactions of those funamental objects such as stars, galaxies, organisms, societies, etc. Universal concepts like "dog" and "chair" don't exist outside the mind.
Okay, then we are using different terms. Nominalism was a reaction against ontological realism, not epistemic realism. I was speaking of ontological realism; you were discussing epistemic realism, i.e., that objects exist. Epistemic realism is anti-idealist. Ontological realism is anti-nominalist.