Atheists - prove it.

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91... that's not a problem, as the point of an argument to show a contradiction in two claims is that there has to be a contradiction to show. Failing to recognize this is idiotic. Also the point of analogies, such as the one you used, is actual similarity. That doesn't exist as it is entirely possible for a being to be identical AND X+1, as X+1 vs all other X's is arbitrary by your own statement.

91, your argument is also ridiculous because the very same kind of argument is used to disprove the existence of the best of all possible worlds.

You see, when you argue that a best of all possible worlds doesn't exist, you refer explicitly to X+1 kind of reasoning, y'know the world would be better if there were more of X. However, if that kind of reasoning doesn't work for moral perfection why should we hold it works for world perfection? After all, if I say that there is a best of all possible worlds, how can asserting that a world with more happy people or less earthquakes would be better? By 91 logic, that would be ridiculous, as you're saying a world can be better than the best of all possible worlds. So, the statement "There is always a better world... there can always be one less earthquake or one more happy person. " which you made, would have to be false. However, if it is valid, then we can substitute terms to say "There is always a morally better being... it can always create a world with one less earthquake or one more happy person". It either holds for both, or for neither. If it holds for neither, you have to say that this is the best of all possible worlds. If it holds for both, God is morally imperfect.

We're beating around a bush for a point where you are not only being ridiculous, but even downright inconsistent in how you reason. It's just sad, sick, and disturbing.

I agree there is no best of all possible worlds. Since there is no best world it is not incumbent on a morally perfect being to chose it. Therefor it is not always true that a moral being must always chose a better world. The Underachiever Problem fails because it is only incumbent on a morally perfect being to chose a good world, not the best world.

Further maximal greatness entails that the property is justified in all possible worlds. If the world cannot be chosen by a maximally great being then such a world is not feasible and has no bearing on the property in question. This is simple stuff AG, your abstinence will not get you to a justified contradiction.



You are equivocating between a possible being and a logically possible choice, they are not necessarily the same thing. Your statement:



Assumes that a morally perfect being must necessarily make a better world. This is simply not the case since it cannot be necessary for such a being to do the impossible (which the best of all possible worlds is). The fact that it cannot do the impossible does not make the being impossible, only the action.

Therefor, if such a being cannot chose the best of all possible worlds then it necessarily entails that its choice is the best choice that can possibly be made. From this, asking the being to improve by +1 asserts a logical contraction, since you are requiring the decision of a perfect being to be improved upon. You just do not seem to understand how bad your argument is and I am starting to think you never will understand it.



The logical conception of God being discussed here is that put forward by St. Anselm: God as the greatest logically possible being. The other conception of God is as the creator of all things not God. I tend to prefer the first one, as it allows for a greater understanding of God and his necessary attributes. A good while ago, natural athology attempted to show that individual attributes were not possible for God to have. They have since given up on this. More recently atheology moved onto trying to show that the traits were incompatible with each other (like justice and mercy). However, this has been turned on its head by modern philosophers who make the claims of atheology into arguments in favor of the triune concept of God. As a result, the work of natural atheology is mostly used by Christian apologists on polytheists or unitarians.

If you are looking for a good account of the whole matter. Check out 'The Coherence of Theism' by Richard Swinburne. Its publication in 1970 pretty much routed the natural atheologians.

Here are also some good like interviews with Swinburne:
http://www.closertotruth.com/participan ... nburne/103

Never required the being to choose the best possible world. Only required the being to NOT pick a world worse than another world. The logical requirements are different, as it is always possible pick a world better than any given world.


Well, no, it assumes that the choice of a world is a moral choice. A being that makes a better moral choice is morally better than one the one who doesn't make that better choice.

I never said that the being had to do anything impossible, it is just that when you follow the logic, the requirement ultimately ends up being impossible, even though every step along the way is entirely possible.

In any case, there is no equivocation. X+1 logic is being used in both instances.


91, the problem is that by definition the choice made ISN'T the best possible choice, as if an infinite chain of increasingly better worlds exist, and all of these worlds are actualizable, then a better world exists by definition. So, if you say "this world is the best choice that can possibly be made" AND "God can actualize any possible world" AND "there are better possible worlds" then you have engaged in a contradiction, because a better world can be actualized by definition.

You don't seem to recognize that your argument is stupendously bad to the point where I cannot fathom how any reasonable person can be so stubborn against plain and simple reasoning. I don't think that you are capable of improvement. I do think that your actions suggest intellectual dishonesty of the highest degree. You've literally disputed DEFINITIONS shared by logic textbooks. There is nothing I can imagine as a clearer sign of a defective character than that.


Which is why... they dried up and disappeared? Natural "atheologians" still exist, they still make intellectually vibrant arguments, and honestly, they aren't apologist hacks as much as their opponents.

That is why it is always best to only say what you mean and to then also mean what you say.


He cannot make a rock too big to move, He cannot make a one-ended stick ... and because of His absolutely morality, perfect or not, He cannot do anything contrary to His own nature or character.


Do you know the source of that kind of thinking? It is directly attached to the practice of "each man doing what seems right in his own mind" running rampant throughout Christianity (and as thereby projected onto "God" for justification).

You had earlier mentioned the possibility of God being defiant ...

Against who and/or what?! Have you ever tried thinking that one through?!

In any case, either He is moral or He is not.


Let's play "Make a deal": You remain in your confusion and I will stop trying to address it.


Sure, and just like he was talking about a real mustard seed, eh?!


Yes, the size of a mustard seed.


To an extent?! Ah, now there is that old "each man according to his own mind" thing once again (and where the taught ones had simply been told to pay their taxes).


Not true. He taught his disciples to "do what they say they are doing (but are actually not doing at all), and to not do as they all actually do.


No.


All of that god-man-alive-roll-em-on-over-dead-n-back-on-over-alive-again-man=god stuff.


Not yet. That is just a hope held by those who understand salvation awaits all who endure in righteousness to the end where salvation awaits those who do.


What would that have to do with anything? But yes, you did answer ...


Even as/when just a child, "the little professor" taught Torah.

This does nothing to disprove the claim of God to being the best possible being for having chosen this world, since there is no being who could choose better. This is just silly AG. The being picks a world that is Good because the best is impossible. The choice made is maximally great because no logically possible being could chose better. Saying from this that a being is greater who makes a better world is irrelevant, since no being like that is possible. Further, requiring a being to do this, requires a being to do more than that which is maximally great which is a contradiction. God is limited by one thing, that which can be logically done, it is not logically possible for any being to have chosen better so it is not required for the claim to be maximally great, to have chosen better.

http://www.closertotruth.com/video-prof ... urne-/1035

91, it is definitionally true that an omnipotent being could have picked better BECAUSE there are infinite better choices that an omnipotent being has the capability of actualizing.

The fact that this leads to contradiction is why IT IS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST YOUR POSITION. If I take two things you've accepted and show them to contradict, then I show that one or the other must be false.

Finally, by your argument, you still haven't disproven the idea of a best of all possible worlds. Saying "more happy people" are possible, is to beg the question, by your kind of logic. After all, if there is a best of all possible worlds, then a world with more happy people isn't possible. In fact, *really* what you are actually saying is that both THERE IS a better possible world, *AND* there isn't a better possible world. "The choice made is maximally great because no logically possible being could chose better. Saying from this that a being is greater who makes a better world is irrelevant, since no being like that is possible." I mean, let's just face it, if no logically possible being can create a better world, then how is this better world actually logically possible? It can't be actualized. It can never be actualized. It's actualization is denied as a matter of logic.

But at the root of it all, this just all comes down to be absurd. You've raped so much reason in your entire approach that none of this BS makes any sense at this point, as you've continually asserted contradiction after contradiction and you, somehow, just cannot come to recognize that your intellectual failure is deep, abiding, disgusting, and intolerable.


Swinburne's definition of perfection is a failed definition of perfection. A being that does his minimal requirements is by no means the best possible being. In fact, nothing in what he presented as perfect is well-defined enough to even say what "perfect" means in any practice. It's just garbage.

"A perfect being will be as good as a being can be".... still doesn't avoid the problem. A being can be good to an infinite degree. His sidestep doesn't work. "A lot of goodness" is really not analytic at all. In fact, the term is arbitrary. To just give some arbitrary quantity of goodness, as "perfection" when this amount is not defined or anything else, not only shows that this isn't a coherent idea(coherent ideas give us something specific and meaningful), but it also appears to violate the principle of sufficient reason, which would require something more extensive. More meaningful.

As for "any the more perfect" the problem is that if his nature is to be better, he will make better choices. So.... by failing to make a better choice where he could, this shows a character defect, just as if I failed to make a good choice.

He is not spelling out the notion of God in a coherent way. "Making lots of good things and doing nothing bad" isn't perfect, it isn't actually specific enough to be coherent. How much is "lots"? How come there is logical variation within this standard? If something is perfect, there can't be better and worse within that standard, but this is possible in the definition Swinburne gives. If perfection lacks variation, and Swinburne's definition allows for variation, then Swinburne's definition is insufficient.

Would a person be a better person if they made a better decision? Well, yes, that's actually obvious. If the decision is moral, then it either adds to, or reflects their moral character, and either way, they're better.

In any case, that video just reaffirms my opinion of Swinburne, that he's just a waste in the philosophical landscape. Nothing he's given in "morally perfect" is perfect, or even meaningful. I mean, "morally perfect" is a maximum, and he hasn't defined a maximum AT ALL, nor is it clear that this is a maximum given that there are clear intuitions that this is NOT a maximum, and that the behavior fails to represent that of a maximum. He's given garbage, and idiotic theists give him leeway because it favors what they want to be the case, but not because this is actually philosophically reasonable. A lot of the things Swinburne argues really are not, but rather idiotic dogmas that should have long been discarded.(the man's a f*****g dualist. How much more pathetic can you get than this wretch?)

There is no contradiction in a perfect being creating this world. There is a logical contradiction in demanding that said being must do more. You are asserting a contradiction and then inferring whatever you want from it... this is the principle of explosion... something you do not understand.



No I am saying there is a maximally great being from this it can only do what a maximally great being can do. A world that is better may be more perfect but this is not a feasible world if it is not actualizable by said being. So then saying that since said being cannot make such a world, then it is impossible asserts a contradiction. There is a vast gap between a world which is logically possible and a world that is logically feasible. Something may be intrinsically possible but not feasible for a maximally great being. All you have done is point this out: THIS IS OBVIOUS. However if you assert that a maximally great being must do that which is not feasible for it do then YOU ARE ASSERTING A CONTRADICTION.

He cannot die, can he?


You seem to be saying that God can do anything that contradicts logic, hmm, so do you believe that God can do this:
Make other gods, can he create another god more omnipotent than he is? Even further, can he create an infinite number of gods, and each more omnipotent than the previous one (remember the first one is more ommnipotent than the original god) (well, I'm implying with this that wether it makes sense to say that infinity+1 > infinity)

I mean, it makes more sense to think that an omnipotent being is bounded by logic.


The 'problem of evil', suggests otherwise.


well, I'd say that it makes sense to say that God cannot make an infinite rock, and then create a second rock that is greater than the first one.

No, there is no contradiction in asserting that this being must do more than create this world. The underlying principle is simple.


..... Umm.... except a better world is actualizable. The stopping point picked out by your theology is arbitrary, thus violates the principle of sufficient reason.

You're trying to say that if such a being doesn't create a better world, then talking about creating a better world is impossible. That's where the contradiction is.

Logically possible and logically feasible aren't separable here, as it is entirely feasible for God to have made another decision if the choice between X and X+1 is arbitrary, which you've admitted.

A maximally great being is capable of creating a better world though, because there is no reason why it can't. You already stated, that the choice of X over X+1 is arbitrary. If it isn't arbitrary, give us some reasons why said being picks X over X+1. If there are no reasons, then this falls victim to the principle of sufficient reason. In any case you're making up distinctions as you go along because your theology sucks. You've literally raped intuition. You've literally raped logic. You're even trying to rape the idea of philosophy. What else do you want to violate today?

AG, well, I'm not sure about the issue relating to X+1 over X, my lay mind tells me that that seems to require an objective morality as claimed here, I mean, if it happens that we get to X+1, there will be always people claiming that there is better than that and so on, I think.

Does that undermines my membership to The WP Strident Atheists?

The "better than that" is kind of a central part of the argument. The problem is that if there are always better choices to make, and choices made are a matter of character, then the moral scale also increases infinitely.

There is a logical contradiction inherent in stating that a maximally great being must do more than a maximally great being is required to.



Arbitrariness is entailed in the choice, it is unavoidable. The principle of sufficient reason is satisfied since no perfect decision is possible. It is just not necessary for a perfect being to necessarily create perfect worlds when such a world is impossible. Further, if a better world is always preferable and a perfect world is impossible then arbitrariness is necessary and logically unavoidable.



No. What I am saying, is what I have written.



They are necessarily separate here. You are not grasping this argument. It is possible for a a perfect being to create a better world. However, it is not incumbent on said being to always select a better world because it continues on ad infinitum. From this (you need to understand that this FOLLOWS from the statement, your last statement discusses only the first part of what I am saying, which is the wrong part), it necessarily follows that the perfect being make an arbitrary choice from amongst a range of good worlds (your argument totally rules out the possibility that there could be many morally equal worlds, so the choice would be arbitrary there also). That decision is the best possible decision that can be made by a logically possible being. Suggesting that a being then MUST create a better world asserts a logical contradiction. Since, that choice, is the best of all possible choies that can be made, a different choice for a better world is not feasibly actualizable by a maximally great being (the idea might be logically coherent but it is not feasible).

Right, and that's why I never engaged in that contradiction.


Well, right, but arbitrariness IS a violation of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason requires reasons for every fact. There is no reason for an arbitrary choice.

Arbitariness is only necessary if THEISM is true. So... you're not fixing anything.


So... nonsense. You're saying nonsense. Got it.


However, it is necessary to select a better world in all cases. The fact that it goes on endlessly doesn't change the obligation to pick X+1 over X in each circumstance where this occurs.

Actually, no, that choice isn't the "best possible decision" because if it is an arbitrary decision, nothing qualifies it as "best". It is an "arbitrary possible decision".

The problem is that I'm actually on your first sentence saying "No, ad infinitum doesn't matter for the obligation to pick X+1 over X, as in each and every instance of this, an obligation to make the right choice would exist, and the failure to make this choice would be a moral imperfection."

Except that your claim of X as the "best possible choice" is disingenuous as it is arbitrary, and X+1 is still by definition a better choice, because it is a better world. So, to assert that X is the "best possible choice" when X+1 is better and possible(you can't say X+1 is a choice impossible to make, because the ability to choose X+1 is granted by omnipotence, and there is no sufficient reason to pick X over X+1 because the choice is arbitrary) by definition is a contradiction.

How you go around without seeing this is just beyond me, and I see no real reason to put up with such foolishness.

Nobody seems to have noticed the subliminal message I added to this thread

Lol. This is where you went wrong. Of course it changes the obligation. Something is a contradiction also if it flows necessarily to contradiction. In this view God is required to chose but God cannot chose. You are saying this says something of God, when it actually says something of the choice. God need not be jusified in choseing a world if God cannot be justified in the choice. God is never required to make a choice which entails a logical contradiction. As long as the God nature of God is sufficiently explicative in this world, then God cannot be more justified in his choice than he is. God's claim to maximumly great is met.

There is no lack of arbitrariness, whether theism is true or not.