People do not exist

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People (or better yet, persons) do not exist. Nobody can prove otherwise.

To get into this, let's analyze what we mean by a person. First, let us start off with the assumption that a person is a being that consciously acts, as opposed to a being that unconsciously acts, like a rock. Secondly, let us assume that a person is a being that has a well-defined identity.

Now the issue with the first assumption is that when we look at how human beings act, we can recognize on some study or intuiting backwards, that a human being's actions are to a great extent unconscious. We see examples of this every day.
"People follow the incredibly complex rules of language use without having any conscious knowledge of those rules ... Many distinguished writers "write with their pens" and the examples are not limited to literature. So much "thinking" is unconscious that the very concept of "mind" becomes problematic" - Richard Posner from The Problems of Jurisprudence
For example, even I am not fully thinking through my writing as I write it. Sure, it is not as if I am utterly unengaged, but the words I used are not each consciously chosen, but rather they appear out of my fingers without substantive levels of thought for most individual words.

Not only that, but decision making itself is not conscious, as in studies of the brain done by Benjamin Libet, information expressing a decision made is found in the mind before the decision itself is known to the conscious mind. What does this mean? Well, it means even our conscious decisions seem to really be unconsciously made, thus further undermining the degree to which human actions can be labeled conscious actions.
http://www.consciousentities.com/libet.htm

This goes even further with optical illusions, such as the phi effect, where two lights are flashed but most people observe a light that moves and even one that changes midway between its movement, despite the fact that this would indicate that we perceived the change in color before we perceive the light with the new color. Because of this, we have to sort of wonder how great of an extent to which our very sensation of consciousness is really representative of reality, as the only way a change midway in the movement of the light is possible is if the contents of our consciousness are unconsciously processed, meaning that we don't directly consciously perceive our reality, but rather unconscious facts are responsible for our conscious perceptions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_Phi_phenomenon

If the consciousness is not the doer nor the decider of actions, and it is not the receiver of external facts, then properly speaking, we are not consciously acting in any sense at all.

Secondly, persons have a well-defined identity, however, human beings lack a good theory for their identity. I am myself, and I consider me to still be myself if I live 50 more years, however, during all of that time, most of the components comprising my body will be replaced, and most of the ideas and beliefs I hold to now are likely to be ones that a future self would reject. So, if this is case, in what sense am I still myself then at this future point in time? What is the meaningful difference between aging 50 years and having my mind removed by a mad cybernetics expert who wanted to implant a robotic mind into my body? Think about it, both minds have different components than the current mind, both minds will have different beliefs, so why should me+50 years be different than my body with a robotic brain? And given that it seems obvious that me+robotic brain is not me at all, then in what sense can me+50 years be me? Well, it seems difficult to say it is me given that.

In fact, problems with identity are so powerful that some philosophers actually consider our identity to just be a narrative fiction created by the mind to help it function, rather than any strong thing with actual existence.
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm

Because we not only aren't beings who consciously act and have strong identities, but are beings who neither consciously act nor have strong identity, I must conclude that we are not people. And given the lack of evidence about other worlds, and other people-y beings experienced on this world, I must conclude that people do not exist and nobody can prove otherwise.

No, MY soplipsism is correct and you're just a figment of my imagination. I invented you. You are only the part of me that I allow you to be. I can unimagine you and you will cease to exist. The only reason you think you're real is because I choose that. :-b

The direction you are going is the opposite of mine in some ways. Solipsism is more of a result of Idealism, which holds that ideas and minds are the essence of reality, and rejecting the existence of persons is more of a result of reductionism, where minds and ideas are stripped away from reality.

Additionally, I included myself in my analysis, so this isn't a matter of solipsism. This is much closer to straight-up nihilism.

I can just reject your assumptions and deny your definition of "person." The lack of conscious action is irrelevant to a determinist like myself and so cannot be a defining point of whether a given entity is a person. Also, a person is usually dynamic rather than static, so it does not matter that a person lacks a well-defined identity over long periods of time. A person is usually stable enough in the short term, so it doesn't matter if they change over longer spans.

Determinism has nothing to do with conscious action, it has to do with physical determination. A determinist could still hold to the idea that people act consciously in most of their actions.

Additionally, a person may be dynamic, but if a true theory of identity does not exist, then in what sense does the person exist? Short-term stability isn't the big issue, the issue is whether identity really exists in the first place, as it is hard to say that persons exist if we can't properly specify these beings, after all, there must be a meaningful difference that tells us that a bit of matter in a time-space location should be labeled a person, rather than just a complex carbon-based process.

Orwell, if my definitions suck, then how would you identify a person as something different than a rock? The best I can see for you at this point is arguing "persons are the things denoted as such by information processing methods used by human beings". The issue with this definition is that "person" doesn't have a real meaning, but rather it seems as if it is arbitrary. If personhood has seeming moral weight, probably also metaphysical weight, then how can it be that personhood is just arbitrary?

For all I know, nothing exists but me.

I was going to write a reply, but I seem to have vanished in a puff of logic.

Does AG exist? topic

The proof is not in the pudding, or any other substance.

If AG is a person, he does not exist. Now how can any of us say such a thing if people do not exist?

One of those conundrums! Is existence falsifiable? Is any of this possible?

If we are not people, could we exist?

Except that those conscious actions might still be predetermined by prior events. Another way of thinking about it has to do with the question "what is free will?". Most people don't like the idea of actions being predetermined because in their perceived idea of free will, any past action could of been done otherwise, however if actions are not predetermined they are random. You also can't consider actions to be that of free will if they are just random impulses from ones nervous system.

Well, they would still be predetermined. The issue is that if you consciously act, you could be said to be freely enacting your will. If your actions aren't fully conscious though, in what sense can you be said to just be enacting your will? It gets even more difficult to say that, because we know our will as our conscious will, but the conscious isn't choosing, thus even compatibilism is trickier.

Simple enough, a specific human genetic pattern occupying a physical human body is a person. Twins are two distinct persons, and clones (if/when human cloning occurs) would be distinct persons as well. This resolves the identity issue just fine, as a person's identity is (in almost all cases) determined by their unique genetic pattern. In the case of two humans with identical genetics, there is obviously one person to each physical body. The physical body is gradually replaced over time, but again, it is not difficult to see the chain of continuity in it- it's not as though humans replace their entire bodies at once.

Nagasena, a Buddhist philosopher, whom the Greek philosophical world had contact with, refuted personhood as a class error.

he argues that in the same way that you can't touch the part of the city that is the "London" bit, you can't find the part of your self that is the "you" bit.
Of course, by this measure you can't find anything that is divisible into smaller parts. That trivialities his point a little, but not so much that is is completely lost.

What about chimeras?
http://www.damninteresting.com/?p=412
http://www.boingboing.net/2009/05/01/th ... g-wor.html
(the articles both overlap)

One person, two sets of DNA? Given that it isn't a specific human genetic pattern occupying a physical human body but more than one, it seems as if these people aren't persons under your definition.

Additionally speaking, your definition has further problems. For example, are brain-dead humans still persons? How about freshly dead humans? Also, when do we call a body a "physical human body"? Can a combined sperm and egg count? How about a fetus? How about a living and working human brain in a vat? If a brain in a vat, then why not a hand or leg or torso? If not a brain in a vat, how much of the body is necessary?

That is actually interesting. Thanks for sharing!

I actually agree with the argument, I think if you combine this with Dennett's view of identity as narrative (which I provided a link to, it's the last link I gave, I really found it an interesting article and try to share it to when I can), the objection is dealt with in all practical senses. Y'know, London doesn't really exist as a metaphysical entity, however, London is a useful classification for our mind to deal with and to convey information about what is being roughly talked about.(after all, London is a social convention, not physically or metaphysically distinct, sort of like the question of when a hue is properly blue and when it is properly purple, there is no "purpleness" or "blueness" in existence so we can't say the line at all, but we have basic conventions)

(the parentheses are things I added later, because they came to mind)

Before you go to bed, do you read Nitsche and masturbate?



I'm not sure I feel like wasting my time on the subject, because both solipsism and nihilism share the same fault in that, even if they are true, they aren't the basis of functional models of the world. So let's assume that you're right. So what?


How can you use reductionism and nihilism to form the basis of a usefull epistemology? The only thing that you've suggested so far that looks promising, is Dennett's view of identity as a narrative. But even this seems to lead to the conclusion that even though certian assumtions about the world are wrong, they are nonetheless, usefull.

No, why would I? Nietzsche was not a nihilist, rather he was an existentialist/proto-existentialist. He saw nihilism as being the last men, as they lacked values and purpose, while a Nietzschean concept of man would have the will to face up to the death of God.


I think you feel like wasting your time on this topic because you are loudmouthed and arrogant, but that's just my guess.

Do people just search for a functional model for the world, or do they also search for an explanatory model as well? It seems as if they search for both, so to say "only functional models matter" seems silly and nihilistic in it's own way, given that people clearly search for meaning and understanding, not just predictions. After all "why?" is still a question and a common one at that.

If I am right, then many of our conceptions of human beings are wrong, and many starting points for understanding human beings or expressing ideas about human beings become more questionable. Both of these matter because people base their lives around these conceptions, and often use some starting points as rough sketches for their lives. For example, one legal scholar actually uses the lack of free will as his starting point to reject retributive theories of law, for the reason that he thinks that retributive theories are based upon an understanding of human beings that is questionable/false if free will does not exist. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ... id=1428002 And I use some of the same arguments that he uses.(in fact, I thought about citing his paper, but I thought it more confusing than useful, also if you don't see a download button on the page, try reloading that page)

Finally, I am neither promoting solipsism or nihilism. I said "This is much closer to straight-up nihilism.", but I did not say "This is straight-up nihilism.", and the difference is significant, because nothing I have said so far has denied reality, facts, or anything like that.


Reductionism is already the basis of useful epistemology, as the notion of Occam's razor is a powerful heuristic in philosophy and science. Dennett's view of identity as narrative is only useful if we reject more standard notions of identity.

Not only that, but if you accept "usefulness" as your sole criterion for what you consider "true", I think you've already got a significant issue. Why? Because then even God could be considered true by that count. When a believer prays, do you not think they feel more at peace? When a believer has some difficulties in their life, do you not think they are comforted by the presence of their God? And don't you think that religions can create communities of people who can interact with each other and extract some pleasure from each other's company? How can such a thing not be considered useful? And it is hard to argue that believers personally gain from giving up their beliefs in many cases, some people may feel better, but others will feel worse, so religion, even though it may be wrong, is an assumption that could still be considered useful. I mean, William James, the pragmatist philosopher who defined truth by usefulness is particularly noted for his defense of belief in God in the essay "Will to Believe". So in order to universally show that belief in God must be wrong, it seems you really have to stick to a standard different than just usefulness.

Finally, if we have a false substantive account, we can overlook more accurate but less narrated realities. This is part of the narrative fallacy. http://lesswrong.com/lw/14q/why_youre_s ... narrative/ "Explanations bind facts together. They make them all the more easily remembered; they help them make more sense. Where this propensity can go wrong is when it increases our impression of understanding." A false notion of personhood and identity increases our impression of understanding, but it can diverge from what seems best. So, even if identity works, this does not mean that identity won't lead to theories that are less effective than we would likely run into if we reject the assumption. (which is sort of part of the John Humbach paper I already referenced)

Finally(again, just to protect against any attacks), no, I don't see the distraction of narrative and search for why as mutually exclusive. Focusing on one can surely be dangerous to the other, but both are deeply relevant to human interests.