Autistic (Asperger) Student had 900 child porn collection

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[b]Minister warned on porn filters - January 1, 2008[/b]

LABOR'S plan to introduce mandatory internet filters will send Australia down a censorship path similar to China's and Singapore's, but will not stop computer-savvy children looking at banned sites, according to the NSW Council for Civil Liberties.

The council's vice-president, David Bernie, said the Federal Government plan was political grandstanding. It would force users to ask internet service providers to lift a block on extremely violent and pornographic sites.

"It is a gimmick," Mr Bernie said. "It's been sold to the public as protecting children from pornography but what is dangerous about these filters is that parents will think their children can't access pornography on the internet when in fact they can.

"Anybody who's computer-savvy can work their way around these filters in about two minutes maximum," he said.

Mr Bernie said the filters would lull parents into a false sense of security and discourage them from monitoring their children's internet activities. Only adults would be restricted by the filters, he said.

"Will there be some database of people who want to access adult pornography, which is legal in most democratic countries?"

"It has serious implications for freedom of expression. When you start filtering material on political grounds - even if the material is objectionable or quite awful - we're heading in the same direction as China and Singapore."

The Telecommunications Minister, Stephen Conroy, pointed to European examples of successful restrictions to quell fears the move could slow connection speeds.

"Labor makes no apologies to those who argue that any regulation of the internet is like going down the Chinese road," Mr Conroy said yesterday. "If people equate freedom of speech with watching child pornography, then the Rudd Labor Government is going to disagree."

Britain and Scandinavia had successful internet restrictions, he said. "The internet hasn't ground to a halt in the UK, it hasn't ground to a halt in Scandinavian countries and it's not grinding the internet to a halt in Europe."

The measures would ensure only a "clean" feed of internet material was reaching schools and households and a list of banned sites would be prepared by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, he said.

In March 2006, the then communications minister, Helen Coonan, said she rejected filtering because it would slow speeds for all users without effectively protecting children. A national system could cost $45 million to set up and $33 million a year to maintain, she said.

P2P Networks endangered by LogP2P
============================
A depressing story

by benign

Long Title: Why LogP2P (and similar to follow) will destroy eMule and other Peer-to-Peer Networks, and
possible counter measures.
Keywords: eMule, P2P, RIAA, IFPI, MPAA, WIPO (TRIPs), , LogP2P, Surveillanceware, Censorware,
LogIRC, LogProtect, APF (AntiPedoFiles), Kazaa, Gnutella, eDonkey, MLdonkey,
Home_land Sec_urity.


INTRODUCTION
````````````````````````
In 2002, a coder named Frederic Aidouni and a cop named Philippe Jarlov together started at Bordeaux (France) production of surveillanceware called LogP2P. It is based on experiences gathered earlier with another program called LogIRC, which was developped by Frederic Aidouni and Cyril Vrillaud in 2001, and which is now used by hundreds of law enforcement and security organizations in western oriented countries troughout the world, to track down people chatting and exchanging so called illegal content on IRC. Jarlov is also involved in production of APF (AntiPedoFiles) a descriptive image database used by law enforcement organizations, which can build up picture and file databases containing descriptive extracts of incriminated pictures and movies, which is essential for rapid recognition and catalogueing of such files. APF uses image recognition routines delivered by www.practeo.ch and www.ltutech.com. Jarlov also developed LogProtect (together with Luc Bellego + Michael Ballester), a censorware content filter which is now used by paranoid parents (and schools) to block certain incoming internet content and to remove outgoing keywords like names, adresses and phone numbers (based on a keyword database). None would mind about this, but the program also logs every activity of the children using their computers, and sends silent alerts to the surveillor. Quite contrary to its appealing pretext of protection, in fact it serves for perfect censorship, surveillance and control of the children while they're unsuspectingly using the internet.


What is LogP2P and how is it working?
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First, LogP2P, despite using open software (linux + python + samba+ libpcap) is NOT open, but classified (a blattant GNU public license violation). Only cop- and anti-pedo organisations are able to get it by now (but they are already in negotiations to finance development by selling it to the copyright protection organisations).
LogP2P, running under Linux, is essentially a highly specialized network sniffer and is used in combination with P2P clients (eMule, eDonkey, MLdonkey, Kazaa, Gnutella), logging the network traffic on their specific IP ports (i.e. 4662-4672 with eMule for example).
The data is logged and analyzed by LogP2P in realtime and derived results are shown in the GUI of LogP2P.
Given, an eMule client and LogP2P are running together on a computer, and a number of ed2k links are added to the download section of eMule. This will generate eMule network traffic, triggering LogP2P to log, analyze, and show numerous computed infos, which it is extracting from eMule traffic. For each file being downloaded by eMule, LogP2P will log and show, what IP numbers are sharing this file, how much of the file is already downloaded by every single IP adress, lookup/whois result of each IP number, which of the monitored files are being downloaded by the same IP number, time of downloading and lots more. Combined with lookup results, eventually all this gathered information will give an exact picture of who is/was downloading what file at what time, and also, if an already logged user is also downloading further tracked files. This enables whatever organization who owns and runs a copy of LogP2P, to setup a BigBrother-like, perfect and gapless surveillance on any subset of eMule users and/or shared files, which they are eager to control (ie. MP3 and OGG sound files by RIAA and IFPI, MPG + AVI for MPAA, loli + r@ygold + hussyfan by the cops & pedo hunters, PDF files by the International Book Publishers Association, the users Monte Christo + Huckleberry Finn + Osama Bin Ladin by CIA and Dept. for Homeland Security, Software by WIPO (TRIPs), and so on.
And worse: Interested people can also share in eMule their own "Honeypot", "Trap" and "Lure" files and track you down while you are downloading them, and afterwards "harvest" your hardware and/or the fines you've been sentenced to pay. Easy money for cops, copyright- and pedo-hunters (and of course an easy way to get rid of political opponents), am I right?
Why the pedos first? Why those pogroms against them (not only on P2P)? Simply, because they are a very easy target to hit. They are such a stigmatized minority now, they could even be killed without hard consequences. Cops are quite cowards, they usually select the weakest possible target to gather experience.


Consequences of LogP2P operation
````````````````````````````````````````````
The consequences of prolonged monitoring with LogP2P by the mentioned organizations are already visible and future prospects can be figured out easily. If the file-sharing systems (including especially eMule) do not soon take efficient counter-measures, they will gradually die out from lack of users (only very few people can afford offshore hosting). With the aim of LogP2P (and similar software to come), which is now run by several law enforcement facilities and certain private anti-pedo organisations from several countries, hundreds (or thousands ?) of P2P users, especially eMule users, have been tracked down since big logging business started. They have been arrested for months, ALL (!) their IT equipment and ALL (!) data media being confiscated, they are faceing endless and downwearing proceedings with harsh jail sentences and ruinous fines. Some of them even lost their jobs. Among them are numerous brothers (and sisters), which were contributing to our file sharing community with high amounts of money, programming skills, computing power and server time. It's worse: a growing number are uncautious youngsters, just curious and without any idea, what they are dealing with, still lacking the skills needed to hide their real IP adresses successfully. Those robberies of the police stand in blattant disparity to the cause. Their targets didn't harm anyone, they just downloaded files which anyway are present millionfold in the internet.
LogP2P has grown a high risk and starts to cause devastating damage to the entire file sharing community. RIAA, IFPI and MPAA have just begun to evaluate LogP2P, or are developing similar Surveillanceware (source: personal communication), and it is only a question of time, when they will start to run their own logging business.


Antidotes against LogP2P
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There are two crucial facts a logger must proof, to win a trial against you:
First he must make sure, you really downloaded the COMPLETE file (if you only had part of the file, you will not be punishable). Second he must get proof of your real IP-Adress. At these points we can hook in:
1) eMule for example could be modified in such a way, that there is an additional download mode selectable, 'safe download' or so. This kind of download would use an altered download scheme, which creates a double entry in the download section, splitting correspondingly the temp-file into part 1 + 2 of random size, but both of them showing the full length of the file, only that each of them says, the part which is represented by the other one, has already been downloaded (minor problem: both files with the same file name or better without?). As soon as one of the parts is complete, it switches into total silence, and if the other part completes, it switches into saying, that the data which was downloaded by the now silent part, has not been downloaded yet, and in parallel it stops generating download requests (or it sends only fake requests to clients, which do not have the corresponding data). In the end, you have downloaded the whole file, but split into two parts, one of them held in total silence, as if non existing, the other one saying to be still not complete, but not requesting anything. This leaves only the problem, how you take them
out from the downloading section and put them (puzzled together the right way) into a folder not shared.
As long as the files are located in the download folder, anyone who is tracking that file, will get the impression, you keep downloading, but still did not receive the file completely. May be there is a better
solution, and the problem can be solved in complete virtuality, by faked communication. The same scheme
might be applied to add a 'safe release' feature, too.
2) The 'safe download' scheme, described above, should be enhanced further, every eMule client should have some kind of 'borrowable transit throughput slot' acting as a proxy between a transmitting and a receiving client. This slot could be borrowed by any of the other clients wishing to download in safe mode for a certain amount of time. This will generate extra traffic, which might be limited. A file, which is downloaded in safe mode, would thus download more slowly, but secure in turn, as there is always (or at least sometimes) another, occasionally and randomly changing client in between (preferable for each of the two file parts a different one), acting as proxy. Anyone who is tracking that file, would not only log real clients, but also some phantom clients downloading that file, and more important, some false IP numbers in consequence. But only, if the phantoms behave sufficiently genuine, and are not easily distinguished from real clients (i.e. they should download realistic portions of a file; this is, why the concept might fail with small files).
It is undesirable for a prosecutor, to accuse the wrong person, as this will generate very embarassing situations, and worse, it will cause very high compensation claims, which usually are successful, if the court does not recognize any evidence for an accusation.
If the above mentioned antidotes are applied alltogether, they will turn LogP2P useless, as a logger could never be sure, whether a file is downloaded normally or in safe mode, thus showing him only incomplete downloads, or worse, setting him under high risk of tracking down false IP numbers.

One could plug together the (very secure) Freenet client with eMule somehow, to have the advantages of both of them. But most people are not really lucky with freenet, as it is generating tremendous overhead. There is always a tradeoff between security and loss of bandwidth. The antidotes mentioned above generate much less overhead, as they rely on ambiguity rather than perfect safety. From a legal standpoint of view, ambiguity does the job as well, generating a sufficient level of safety. Total security would be suitable under military conditions only, I think.

Summary
````````````
There has formed a conglomerate of officials, private people and private organisations on the extreme right, spanning several european countries, consisting in detail of software developpers, cops and very rich people with strong influence and high financial resources, which succeded in developping and operating software to track down and denounce on a massive scale P2P users downloading files via P2P clients.

List of Persons involved (until June 2004)
``````````````````````````````````````````````````
Frederic Aidouni (Frederic: both 'e' with accent egu)
Owner of the software company named @idounix
Co-developer of LogP2P, LogIRC
<adress>
Algerian descendant. Completely mad; one of his relatives, Bachir Aidouni, was drown in
the Seine at Paris by french cops during 1961, now he is serving exactly those cops, who
murdered his relative.
Relatives: 1yo daughter <name>
18yo <name>

Philippe Jarlov
Rank: Adjutant, Gendarmerie Nationale de France, Section Recherche at Bordeaux-Battesti
Co-developer of LogP2P, LogProtect, APF.
<adress>
Jewish roots; from eastern europe (may be Poland). End jews as cops, if they loose their roots?
Relatives: François Jarlov (Wife: Ulla), Artisan, Poterie du Héron, 40660 Messanges, France

Michael Ballester (Michael: 'e' with two points on it) Co-Developer of LogProtect
<adress>
Luc Bellego (Quebec, Canada) Co-Developer of LogProtect
<adress>
Cyril Vrillaud Co-Developer of LogIRC
<adress>

Pascal Seeger, Carouge/GE (former cop at Groupe de criminalite informatique de Genève) now
working as technical advisor at Action Innocence Group, webmaster of www.e-prevention.ch
<adress>
Relatives: Seeger-Neyroud Sandra (wife ?), <adress>
Seeger Gertrude Paula, <adress>

Sellier Homayra
<adress>
President of Action Innocence Group

David Royston
<adress>
Technical advisor at Action Innocence Group

Philipp Kronig, Chief Officer KOBIK/SCOCI (Switzerland)
<adress>
Eva Bollmann, Analyst at KOBIK/SCOCI
<adress>
Marc Henhauer, KOBIK/SCOCI
<adress>
(KOBIK = Koordinationsstelle zur Bekämpfung der Internetkriminalität )

List of Organizations involved (until June 2004)
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
@idounix, Rue Père Louis de Jabrun 21, 33000 Bordeaux (Dept. Gironde FR)
President: Frederic Aidouni
www.aidounix.com IP: 213.246.36.90

AIG (Action Innocence Group) Geneva (CH), Monaco (MC), Paris (FR), Bruxelles (BE)
President: Homayra Sellier
www.actioninnocence.org IP: 62.50.74.218
actioninnocence.org IP: 62.50.74.219
Mrs. Sellier is extremely rich, due to her marriage with one of the richest men in Switzerland.
Presumably, she is financing most of the activities of the organisation. Now and again, she
organizes caritative gala events for the international jet-set, with such illustre guests as the
princess of Monaco, to rise additional funds for her organization.
As the slogan 'innocence in danger' already indicates, this group promotes an extremly
paranoid and antisexual 'philosophy' or rather attitude. Since the belgian crime case Dutroux,
the group turned into complete hysteria, and in consequence they instrumentalize each minor
incidence to demand more repression and control (especially concerning the internet).
Action Innocence Group is running LogP2P on their servers, and is believed to offer
childporn honeypot-, lure-, and trap-files for download over P2P-Networks and IRC, too.
The organization serves as a half-legal tracker and denouncer for corresponding governmental
offices.

Action Innocence Suisse, 19 rue des Vollandes, 1207 Genève - Suisse
Tél: (+41) 22 735 50 02, Fax: (+41) 22 735 51 02
E-mail: [email protected]
www.actioninnocence.org IP: 62.50.74.219
IP: 62.50.74.0-255 (at least whole subnet class c)
received from psinet provider IP: 62.50.64.0 - 62.50.95.255
(former psinet, now psineteurope, owned by VIA Networks)

Subsidiaries:
Action Innocence Monaco, Europa Résidence, Place des Moulins 43,
98000 Monaco, Tél: +377 97 77 51 11
E-mail: [email protected]
financed by the monegassian royal family
Action Innocence France, Av. Victor Hugo 181, 75116 Paris - France
Tél: +33 01 44 05 05 33, E-mail: [email protected]
Action Innocence Belgique, 62 boulevard de la Cambre
1050 Bruxelles - Belgique, Tél: 02 626 20 00, Fax: 02 626 20 06
E-mail: [email protected]

e-Prevention (www.e-prevention.ch), c/o Original S.A. , Belle Combe 30, 1095 Lutry (CH)
President: Paul Seeger
www.e-prevention.ch IP: 62.50.74.219 (same as actioninnocence.org)

Royston Consulting, Avenue Bella-Vista 9,1234 Vessy/GE
President: David Royston
www.royston-consulting.com IP: 212.74.183.248

Innocence en Danger, Rue des Vollandes 19, 1207 Genève (CH)
President: Wertheimer Valerie
www.innocenceindanger.org IP: 80.247.227.71
(do'nt mix up with "La Flotille", a day-nursery for 70 children, at the same adress)

Logprotect Distribution
President: Phillipe Jarlov
www.logprotect.org IP: 213.186.33.19
www.logprotect.net IP: 217.174.203.209
www.rivageslointains.com IP: 213.186.33.3
www.practeo.ch IP: 62.220.134.98
www.ltutech.com IP: 213.41.68.100

IRCGN (Institut de recherche criminelle de la gendarmerie nationale), Europol, Rosny-sous-Bois (Cedex)
Responsible: Capitaine Eric Freyssinet
STRJD (Service technique recherche judiciaire et documentation), cellule de veille internet, Europol,
Responsible: Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Candalot
Gendarmerie Nationale de France,
Section de Recherche Bordeaux-Battesti (Gironde),
Service de lutte contre la cybercriminalite
www.defense.gouv.fr IP: 195.46.214.111
IP: 195.46.214.0-255 (at least whole subnet class c)
IRCGN are running LogP2P on their servers.

KOBIK (Koordinationsstelle zur Bekämpfung der Internetkriminalität)
SCOCI (Service de Coordination Criminalite sur Internet)
President: Philipp Kronig
www.cybercrime.admin.ch IP: 162.23.39.65
and www.fedpol.ch IP: 162.23.39.65
IP: 162.23.39.0-255 (at least whole subnet class c)
KOBIK/SCOCI are running LogP2P on their servers.

www.kkjpd.ch IP: 195.65.77.20
etat.ge.ch IP: 195.65.37.72
www.geneve.ch IP: 160.53.186.105 160.53.186.12
proxytst3.etat-ge.ch IP: 160.53.250.102
www.polizei.adminbs.ch IP: 193.135.25.50
prow3stat1.bs.ch IP: 193.135.25.53
www.jd.bs.ch IP: 193.135.25.57
www.ji.zh.ch IP: 212.47.173.17
www.kapo.zh.ch IP: 212.47.173.17
(bei aspectra.net) IP: 212.47.170.0 - 212.47.173.255
Router: IP: 212.47.172.0-23

IMPORTANT !
Please, spread this contribution to whatever P2P- and Internet-Freedom Forum/Chatroom you know !
Traduisez cette contribution en francais et diffusez dans tous les lieux P2P, etc. vous connaissez, svp !