Dox47 wrote:
What troubles me about hate crime laws is that they do attempt to codify a set of values as being the "correct" ones, and add additional penalties to actions that are already criminal simply because of an assumed motive on the part of the perpetrator. I view this as too much leeway to give to our justice system, while the motivation may be pure, the application will lend itself to abuse, such as using a hate crimes enhancement to legally coerce someone into a plea bargain, or through simple selective application. Even if someone is yelling epitaphs during the commission of a crime, it is still at best an assumption that the crime is based on hate, and in my mind legal penalties cannot be assessed based on assumptions, it violates the whole spirit of "beyond reasonable doubt".
You raise an interesting point, but I am not sure that it changes my perspective.
Courts make inferences daily, within the confines of the "reasonable doubt" standard. Because an accused is protected from being compelled as a witness, the Court is often confined to interpretation of the accused's actions and statements as a means to identify
mens rea. This is precisely the reason that certain statements by an accused are specifically excluded from the rule against hearsay. Absent the ability of a Court (whether a judge alone or a jury) to make such inferences, no person could ever be convicted of crime requiring specific intent.
It also bears noting that we are not dealing with an, "assumption," but rather an inference. Assumptions, clearly, are risky from an evidentiary point of view. The "rebuttable presumption," that a person in possession of more than 28g of certain narcotics has the intention to traffic is just such a risky presumption. In this case, however, we are inferring state of mind from a voluntary action or statement of the accused.
(Note, most of this is written from a Canadian Common-Law perspective, and would only apply
mutatis mutandis to US Common Law jurisdictions.)
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--James